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A Necessity of Morals
Introduction
In his address to the senior philosophy seminar at Pepperdine University on
March 11th, 2015 Dr. John Martin Fischer told the students that his initial motivation for
his work The Metaphysics of Free Will was “to defend moral culpability from the threats
of causal determinism and divine omniscience” while also asserting semi-compatibilism.
Taking that a step further, the goal for my own work is to defend our need for moral
culpability from a metaphysical standpoint. In this essay I will argue that ultimately there
are only two possibilities when it comes to a moral-metaphysical framework, only one of
which involves human culpability: either human existence has intrinsic meaning and
worth, therefore giving weight to our moral decision making and warranting our own
culpability when making moral judgments, or that there is ultimately no objective value
to human existence, thereby neutralizing any supposed moral implications attached to our
actions.
Western Civilization has arrived at a point where it is now a commonly held
belief that morality is relative to the culture that employs it and that there are no
universally set ethical principles that people should be compelled to follow. This vague,
harmless, and socially appeasing view goes by many names: Postmodernism, relativism,
binkyism1 (credit to Mason Marshall, this one is my personal favorite), the list goes on.

1 Mason Marshall. Handout, “Binkyism” Modern Philosophy Course. Pepperdine University, Spring
2015:
“Binkyism is the view that there are certain beliefs which for the following reasons are not worth
evaluating. 1. Their truth or falsity is relative to persons or cultures 2. They haven’t been shown to be
true 3. They can’t be shown to be true 4. They can’t be true or false. Binkyism is a response to a
pervasive problem. Nowadays public debate on political, ethical, and religious issues has a shrill tone:
Bill O’Reilly, John Stewart, Bill Maher, and everyone else talk as if people who disagree with them

While such a claim may seem appealing in that it is inherently inclusive of outside
cultures and beliefs within any given social framework, most especially a “pluralistic
society” like the modern western world it also carries the (allegedly2) unintended
consequence of robbing morality of its value in the form of human culpability.
My first task is to track the status of said culpability through the different
metaphysical theories contained under the umbrella of the free will problem. From there I
can begin to devise what meta-ethical frameworks best fit with what I know about free
will. Throughout this essay I will be drawing heavily from the works of the philosopher
Robert Kane, namely A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will and Ethics and the
Quest for Good.
Argument A: Establishing a Need for a Metaphysical Framework
While naysayers may cry out in protest that this “unintended consequence” is
harmless, I remain thoroughly unconvinced. Any notion that human beings when left
alone will naturally gravitate towards performing selfless acts in the name of goodness
rather than succumbing to their biologically preprogramed (and evolution tested),
survival ensuring selfish tendencies remains in my view an utter fantasy. This is what
necessitates law and order, whether it be physically enforced by the state or
metaphysically imposed by a higher power.
Still, dissenters may cry out that it is not the purpose of the law to legislate and
enforce morality—I both agree and disagree with that statement. Morality informs the
law, and the law is designed to preserve the liberty of the citizens who follow it while

aren’t just mistaken but are also either stupid or perverse. Binkyism is supposed to combat the
problem by making us less sure of ourselves: the hope is, if we’re less confident that we are correct,
we’ll all be gentler with one another.”
2 Binkyism

guarding their freedoms and their lives from those who would harm or infringe on either.
To quote Kane:
“Debates about free will lead to issues about crime and punishment,
blameworthiness and responsibility, coercion and control, mind and body, necessity and
possibility, time and chance, right and wrong… it touches ethics, social and political
philosophy, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, theory of knowledge, philosophy of law,
philosophy of science, and philosophy of religion.”3
As one can see, the Stakes are high. As I will show in the following pages, the
same “freedom” that these western societies pride themselves on cultivating loses value
alarmingly quickly when agents in said society are no longer held accountable for their
actions. In short, moral culpability is the thing that gives our freedom value.
Some people reading this might already be objecting on the grounds that most of
what I am referring to are surface freedoms—namely, mundane choices we make every
day, consciously and unconsciously. What possible moral implications could the brand of
milk I choose to buy have? Again, I believe Kane says it best when he makes the
distinction between surface freedom and freedom of will. The former amounts to making
the decisions described above while the latter amounts to agents being able to do the
things we want (and the freedom to have done otherwise should we have wished it) free
of any constraints, physical, psychological, or otherwise.4 What happens though if the
distinction isn’t between which brand of milk to buy? Without some constraints to inform
our actions, be it legal, moral, or physical, what would stop an agent from choosing to go

3 Kane, Robert (I). A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. Page 2. Oxford University Press. 2005.
4 Kane (I), Page 14

buy milk or go shoot the people next door instead?5(Unless you are Ted Bundy, in which
case you are on your own)
Science, religion, philosophy and psychology all present differing viewpoints as
to what governs the actions of moral agents. (This list is short for the sake of brevity and
in no way is meant to be comprehensive or binding) Physicists may say that all of our
actions are determined by the vibrations and movement patterns of particles at the atomic
level while psychologists may assert that free will is simply a grand self-deception
society engages in out of fear of being controlled (both of these theories representing
determinism). Religious authorities, be them teachers or holy texts may assert a vast
multitude of possibilities. Most religions serve the important social function of teaching
people the right way to act in accordance with the rules of a given society (a crude
definition for ethics), the metaphysical implications being either that these behaviors
being promoted are either the expressed will of a divine power or that all actions and
events involving the physical world and agents in it are simply actors in a cosmic opera
that has been playing out since the beginning of the universe.
Philosophy offers us innumerable ways to address the way humanity should
exercise freedom. The study of ethics informs us what actions are right and wrong while
asking questions about our freedom to make right or wrong decisions entails a multitude
5 Ted Bundy was a serial murderer and rapist who was found guilty of killing 30 different women in

seven states over a four year period. After multiple intense vetting processes by a number of
criminologists and psychiatrists, he was found to be completely sane and claimed full responsibility
for his actions after being convicted, much to the surprise of the general public. When asked about
his motivations for his horrendous crimes, he had this to say “I’m the most cold-hearted son-of-abitch you’ll ever meet” and “I’m not going to kid you. I deserve certainly the most extreme
punishment society has…I think society deserves to be protected from me and others like me” (1989
interview with James Dobson) The important thing for my purposes here is that Bundy seemed
acutely aware of the evil of what he had done, albeit without the emotional reaction of empathy. He
self-reported that his desire began with addiction to pornography which eventually grew into a fetish
for violence against women. Ted Bundy was executed in Pensacola, Florida by the electric chair in
1989.

of facets worth considering. Let us return to the potential positions posited above through
physics and psychology. The belief that all actions taken by agents are preordained by
either our biological make up or the vibrations of the universe is known as determinism.
Determinism becomes problematic for culpability in two key ways. The first issue
is that if determinism is true, then people are not truly free in any sense as the supposed
choices made by agents have been predestined for them. This inference leads directly into
the second problem which is if agents are not actually making decisions themselves due
to unseen forces beyond the control then said agents cannot be held responsible for their
actions (Here I am presupposing that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary and
sufficient condition for free will and thus moral culpability).
Whether or not one endorses determinism or not, one can easily see the problems
this creates for us not only as agents but also as a supposedly well-functioning and just
society. How can we rightly convict and imprison a fellow agent if they did not truly
elect to do whatever wrong thing it was that landed them in court in the first place?
People who endorse this view may counter that punitive action like incarceration or
execution at that point would be for the benefit of the society itself by removing a
threatening agent from the general population, but this view almost entirely negates any
potentially redemptive aspects of justice.
The second major issue with determinism is culpability. How can an agent be
responsible in any moral sense if the agent was not free to choose the actions in question?
Throughout my study of this issue, I have yet to find any account by a determinist
reconciling culpability with this theory. Taking this into account, for the rest of my essay

I will be ruling out determinism as a potential backdrop for my moral-metaphysical
framework.
The next theory of free will I wish to discuss is compatibilism, which holds that
there really is no conflict between free will and determinism after all and that any
supposed conflicts between these two schools of thought boil down to misunderstandings
of both concepts. Compatibilists maintain that freedom means that as an agent one has
the power or ability to take a given action free of any constraints that may befall them, be
it physical, coercive, or compulsive. The key difference here lies in one’s ability to do
otherwise—one could have done otherwise had the agent wanted to, however since in the
physical sense such alternative possibilities remain hypothetical, adherents to this view
believe that this situation can still fall into the determinist camp6. Upon examination it
becomes easy to see how this view of the world became very popular amongst the
enlightenment crowd (Hobbes, Locke, Hume and company) as a way of seemingly
maintaining human culpability through freedom but also attempting to account for their
ever-shifting world view as new developments in the sciences seemingly explained away
the mysteries of existence and human endeavor. As convinced as these great men of the
18th century were, I am still skeptical. It seems to me that while in the hypothetical sense
our potential actions that we could have taken do not carry any weight morally or
metaphysically, if there is only one road that we could have taken for whatever reason, be
it atomic vibrations or predestination, then we were not truly free to make the other
potential choices and that our culpability is merely an illusion.

6 Kane (I), Page 13

Compatibilists may respond that the important thing here is not to confuse
causation and constraint, meaning that while we must realize that our current decisions
are immediately informed and affected by our previous ones—cause and effect, I am
sitting here writing this essay instead of walking to the beach because I have made prior
decisions to procrastinate—I am not actually constrained to sit in this chair. I am
perfectly capable of not finishing this assignment, failing the senior capstone class and
subsequently not graduating from college. (Not) My response to this criticism lies in the
opposing philosophical camp, Incompatibilism. The philosopher Peter van Inwagen is
perhaps the most prominent incompatibilist thinker working today and to counter the
above inference that our decisions are caused by the past he asserts the Consequence
argument. If determinism is true in any sense, then all of our actions are the consequences
of either the laws of nature or past events. We lack the power or ability to affect the past
or the laws of the physical universe, therefore the consequences of these things, including
our own actions, are ultimately not up to us.7 For those thinkers looking to assert our
culpability, Incompatibilism looks quite promising.
I will consider the next theory, Libertarianism. Libertarianism in the context of
free will refers to the belief that agents have metaphysical freedom —that human agency
is not constrained by any outside forces such as atomic vibrations, neural wiring, or
divine predestination.8 For those looking to assert and defend culpability as I am, one
would be hard pressed to find a theory that fits this need better than libertarianism.
That is not to say that Libertarianism lacks its fair share of critics. Dissenters
argue that if human existence were truly not bound by any of the potential parameters in
7 Kane (I), Page 23
8 Kane (I), page 32

question, be it the laws of the physical universe, our brain chemistry, or intervention from
a divine force, then the only thing left is chaos. The randomness that pervades throughout
human existence would act as a parameter to freedom in and of itself; Kane uses an
example of a man whose arm suddenly twitches while he is cutting a piece of fine linen,
causing him to ruin it.9 It would seem that such an event would be a hindrance to the
man’s will, impeding him from freely achieving his purpose.
While I agree that randomness would in this case become a hindrance to the man
cutting linen, the important aspect for my purposes is the effect said parameter would
have on the man’s agency. When it comes to uninterrupted decision making, randomness
may even heavily influence the choice of a given agent while necessitating nothing about
that particular decision. Kane uses the example of a man deciding between Colorado and
Hawaii for his vacation—though he enjoys skiing and has many friends in Colorado, the
man is free to choose to go surfing in Hawaii instead.10 With this in mind I
wholeheartedly believe this theory is the right backdrop when it comes to grounding my
defense of human culpability.
Argument B: Identifying what that Metaphysical Framework Entails
“The starting points of our enquiry are two of the conditions for modernity—
namely, pluralism and uncertainty—which have played a pivotal role in raising doubts
about the possibility of objective values and ethical standards in the minds of ordinary
persons and in the human sciences and philosophy.” 11

9 Kane (I), Page 35
10 Kane (I), Page 36
11 Robert Kane (II). Ethics and the Quest for Good. Page 8. Cambridge University Press. 2010. E Book

Up until this point I have examined the metaphysical theories that dominate the
free will problem. My next concern primarily deals with another aspect of metaphysics:
Meta-ethics. Like Metaphysics, Meta-ethics is the branch of analytical philosophy that
deals with the foundations of the nature of right and wrong—how it is we can know what
is moral and immoral—as opposed to normative ethics which is concerned with the
actions taken by the agent individually. In ancient times these two disciplines would have
been undertaken together—Plato and Aristotle both believed that searching for that which
is the source of goodness was just as relevant to philosophy as doing those things they
judged to be right. The modern day separation of normative and meta-ethics is a product
of the same postmodernist mindset that right and wrong only apply in the context of
one’s obligations towards another and that good and evil do not matter in and of
themselves. On this point Kane has this to say:
“A number of philosophers, including Bernard Williams, have noted that the
tendency in modern times to think of morality in this narrow way—as a matter of
obligations or duties we have towards ourselves and others; and they have contrasted this
view with that of the ancient philosophers who meant by the study of ethics an inquiry
into the nature of the good and the good life generally”.12 I will have more to say on this
in a little while.
Meta-ethical theories about the nature of right and wrong typically divide into
three main camps. The first camp is moral absolutism, which is the idea that right and
wrong exist and remain unchanging in a metaphysical sense as they relate to human
action. The second major theory is moral relativism which proposes that the ethical value

12 Kane (II) Page 61.

of a given action is dependent upon situational factors and to a great extent are contingent
upon the agent performing the action and the social context the action took place in.
Finally, moral nihilism is the idea that there is no need for, nor is there even a way to
measure, moral good and evil. I will consider each of these in depth now.

Moral Nihilism
Moral Nihilism, or simply Nihilism as it is more popularly known, is the theory
that life and physical existence lack any objective meaning and that any and all supposed
moral frameworks do not exist in an objective sense. The consequence of this view is that
no moral decisions can be prescribed a value as being more preferable than another and
that right and wrong are simply abstract cultural constructs humanity adheres to for social
stability.
Popularized by Fredrich Nietzsche in the 19th century, Nihilism is unique in that
rather than promoting a certain normative ethical construct for its adherents to ascribe to,
it rejects granting value in any moral sense and instead asserts two potential viewpoints
regarding morality. The first ethical theory (if you can call it that) endorsed by nihilism is
error theory, which states that no matter how hard people try to assert any sort of
objective moral framework fall short of truly prescribing value to moral judgments. The
second theory found within the nihilist worldview is expressivism, which holds that any
and all value attributed to moral judgments are false because they are simply the opinion
of the agent in question. (See the “Binkyism” footnote on page 3)
On an interesting note, meta-ethical nihilism (if there is such thing) becomes a
problem in that it is a self-refuting argument to say as a meta-ethical law meta-ethical

truths do not exist in any sense. In short, Nihilism is a dud when it comes to trying to
establish metaphysical free will, however it may not rule out physical free will as the
randomly generated universe may still be developing—in that instance, one would have
to discern if the expanding and contracting movements of the cosmos had any sort of
physical impact on human agency. (But that’s another essay, for another time.)
Moral Relativism
Moral Relativism is the meta-ethical theory that the moral value of a given action
is contingent upon the cultural context in which said action is taking place. In this view,
right and wrong differ according to the people group being judged. This worldview is the
absolute epitome of the postmodern thought I have set out to debunk.
Three main normative theories arise from the meta-ethical construct of moral
relativism. The first one bears the same name as its parent worldview. Moral relativism
from a normative standpoint refers to the theory that morality is entirely contingent on the
society practicing it and specifically that all prescriptive claims made by a practitioner of
the theory only stand up to scrutiny when they are made within the context of that
respective agents culture.
The second normative theory that arises from meta-ethical relativism is
consequentialism or utilitarianism. While it may seem slightly odd to see this theory
nestled up to normative relativism, it is important to see that they necessarily derive from
the same meta-ethical worldview. Utilitarianism, while asserting that there is a right and
wrong course of action for an agent to take, shifts the moral value of each possible action
based on the context in which it is being performed. Largely the brainchild of the great
19th century English philosopher and politician John Stuart Mill, consequentialism holds

that the end goal of morality is the maximization of pleasure and happiness for the largest
segment of people possible while simultaneously minimizing the pain and suffering of
the corresponding group. Mill’s primary motivation when promoting utilitarianism was
the benefit of the public--- as a member of parliament he was often exposed to and
consequently sympathetic to the needs and desires of Britain’s working class.
The way I see it, two main problems arise here: first, how does one define and
quantify pleasure or happiness? It seems that is an overtly subjective criterion on which
to predicate moral judgments and value. John Stuart Mill attempted to address this
problem facing Utilitarianism in his book of the same name.13 “Those who know
anything about the matter are aware that every writer from Epicurus to Bentham who
maintained the theory of Utility meant by it is not ‘something to be contrasted with
pleasure but pleasure itself together with the absence of pain’”14 though later he attempts
to qualify pleasure in the two main categories of higher and lower pleasures, I still have
serious misgivings with this account of the good. His argument goes like this:
1. People experience two types of pleasure, A and B
2. People who have enjoyed both pleasures seem to prefer A over B
3. A is a higher pleasure compared to B
4. A is better than B.
At this point I believe it becomes clear that this argument is a little better than hedonism
at this point. This is relativistic in two major ways: first, Pleasure, while seemingly stable
across the human experience, ultimately comes down to personal preference and neural

13 John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism. Fraser Magazine, London. 1861. E book.

www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/mill1863.pdf. Copyright 2012.
14 Mill, Page 4.

wiring. While bathing is generally seen as a pleasurable activity to most people, someone
stricken with Allodynia15 would wholeheartedly disagree.
The second problem as I see it stems from the first. How can an agent make an
objective moral judgment if the ethical system in place denies that such judgments are
possible? Even if we ruled out people who specific medical conditions like the one
mentioned here, how could one quantify one pleasure versus the other? Sexual
intercourse and Opera are both intensely pleasurable, but in completely non-fungible
ways. Taking this into account, I do not see how utilitarianism can escape from the
relativist camp.
The third normative theory I believe falls under the relativist meta-ethical world
view is social contract theory. Written on by many thinkers over the centuries, this theory
centers around what Thomas Hobbes referred to as the “State of Nature”, a view of
human existence prior to civilization in which he affectionately describes life as “nasty,
brutish, and short” and as a “war against all”.16 The ethical theory arises out of man’s
need to survive such a horrendous existence, and this is most effectively accomplished by
a mutual covenant where all partaking members consent to collectively give up some of
their rights for the greater good—in other words, agent A promises not to perform act B
as long as agent C promises not to perform act B either.
Those who disagree with me will say that social contract theory isn’t relativistic
because of the universal applicability of the above claim. Most societies on earth have
prohibitions against murder, theft, and differing forms of public indecency (“action B”).

15 Allodynia is a medical condition characterized by extreme pain upon stimulation of the skin, even
from activities that would normally be enjoyable. This condition was made famous by Howard
Hughes who struggled with Allodynia the majority of his life.
16 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. London. 1651

That being said, I do not believe such a claim can be truly universal--one need not even
imagine a potential world where “action B” is something totally random—this occurs
across cultures all the time.17 I also take issue with the hierarchical biases present with
this theory—as many feminist and other social critics will point out, the social contract
present in a feudal society would completely disenfranchise those on the lower rungs of
the social order. For example, in Medieval Japan it was considered acceptable for a
samurai to test his newly forged sword by killing any beggar he came across on his land.
Similarly, in certain parts of sub-Saharan Africa, female genital mutilation is still widely
practiced as a means of preventing female infidelity. In both of these societies, the
contract being practiced is entirely predicated on those exercising control. This makes the
theory relative to those practicing it and provides shaky footing at best for establishing an
objective measure of agent culpability.
As a sight anecdote, the last component to consider, and potentially the saving
grace for the utilitarian normative view is consequentialism. Consequentialism, while
often going hand and hand with the hedonistic aspects of utilitarianism, does offer the
redemptive quality for my purpose in that agents are held accountable for the results they
produce. Regardless of the society where it is being practiced, the agent in question
would still have to answer for whatever it was he or she brought about. (this will become
relevant later on in my argument)
Moral Absolutism
17 For example, in aboriginal Australian culture it is considered wrong to mention the names of the
dead once they have passed on from this life—such an action is deemed unlucky and also
disrespectful to the person in question. In most western societies, not referring to or talking about a
dead relative on purpose would be considered extremely rude and an insult to the memory of that
individual. This cultural dissonance did not arise out of any biological or societal necessity as some
critics would normally point out when it comes to most cultural difference, it is completely
contingent on the culture practicing the individual action.

Moral absolutism holds that it is not only possible for agents to know right and
wrong, but that it is morally necessary for one to discern these things as part of human
flourishing. As mentioned above, moral absolutism has its roots in the theories of some of
the most ancient thinkers in western thought and pervades throughout the majority of
prominent faith systems as a part of a larger religious metaphysical worldview (though
each of these religions may have vastly different verdicts regarding the source,
motivations, and moral maxims derived from said worldview).
It should come as no surprise after taking this into account that one of the most
prevalent normative ethical constructs to arise from this meta-ethical worldview is Divine
Command Theory. Initially made infamous by Plato in the Euthyphro, Divine Command
Theory holds the view that we can know what is right and wrong based on the instruction
from a divine source, namely holy texts as interpreted by religious scholars and leaders.
This theory has taken American Protestantism by storm over the last century and
consequently enjoys a place of honor amongst pop Christianity in the United States and
abroad, with the bible serving as the primary means by which humans are to discern the
proper way to conduct their lives and to use as a source of goodness on earth.
The second normative theory to materialize out of moral realism is Natural Law
Theory. Originally conceived in antiquity by Aristotle, the concept of Natural Law came
to be popularized in the western cannon by the medieval philosopher St. Thomas
Aquinas. Natural Law Theory holds that we can discern what is right and wrong through
observation of the physical universe—that the divinely-preordained order we see in
nature is indicative of good and likewise the disruption of that order as evil. Due to the
work and influence of St. Thomas on reconciling Aristotelian thought with Christianity,

Natural Law Theory enjoys the position of authority for the Roman Catholic Church and
consequently for over one billion people worldwide.
The most unique view certainly to fit within the theory of moral absolutism is
Deontological ethics. Theorized by the continental philosopher Immanuel Kant in the 18th
century, Deontology holds that the moral maxims prescribed by it are entirely a priori,
meaning they exist independently of anything we usually relegate to the realm of
experience and that all such moral maxims are absolute and unflinching no matter the
circumstance. Murder, Theft, and lying are all and will always be wrong—even if done
for a supposedly moral reason such as protecting the innocent from harm or retrieving a
previously stolen item for its original owner. I call Deontology unique not because of the
severity of its claims but rather because it asserts them without necessitating the authority
of a divine power.
Putting it Together
Where does this leave us? For 15 pages I have lead my readers down a trail
covering the metaphysical accounts of free will and meta-ethical accounts of morality and
the normative theories they entail. Now comes the time for me to reconcile these
accounts together in order to what I assert to be the mutually exclusive options we face—
either meta-ethically objective morality exists and humans as agents are culpable for their
actions, or we cannot reconcile any of the theories of morality with our metaphysical
accounts of free will and the whole thing falls apart.
First up to bat is determinism. Determinism rules out culpability by asserting that
all of our choices are predetermined before we make them and our interactions with the
greater universe are contingent in some way on either atomic movement, biology or

psychological conditioning. (I have a feeling Nietzsche would really enjoy that
assessment) The endpoint with this theory is that we do not have free will. Determinism
is out.
Compatibilism is, by its very nature, an interesting case. Due to the nature of
freedom in allowing for causation the compatibilist worldview, two normative theories
immediately come to mind—divine command theory and Deontology. Divine command
theory is compatible with metaphysical compatibilism because God (one of the potential
constraints on free will being divine foreknowledge) is the source of all morality in this
case. In the normative account of Divine command theory, God serves as both the
beginning and the end of human moral discourse, challenging agents to perform actions
according to his plan for humanity. Deontology is also compatible with compatibilism in
that the agent is bringing about the action for its own sake—the fact that moral truths are
seen as a priori serves as both a motivating and qualifying factor for culpability within
this meta-ethical worldview.
And now we come to Libertarianism. Libertarianism asserts wholeheartedly that
human agents have free will, and thus said agents are entirely culpable here. What does
this mean for our normative considerations? The first thing we can infer from
libertarianism is that if we are indeed metaphysically free, it is for two potential reasons.
The first is that a higher power endowed us with the ability to exercise our moral muscles
to find our way in the universe—this fits nicely with divine command theory, deontology,
and the slim glimmer of hope found in the consequentialist aspect of utilitarianism. The
point is, metaphysical libertarianism is a strong candidate for discerning meta-ethical and
normative principles. On the other hand, if libertarianism is true because the universe is

came about from a random singularity at some point in the distant past, then we are put in
an interesting place when it comes to discerning human culpability. This is the one place
where metaphysical nihilism could actually (albeit strangely) serve as a morally
informative principle by showing implying the most freeing account of free will we could
imagine: If God (or any other objective, all powerful, vindictive force does not exist, we
would not have to interact with the moral parameters set by objective accounts of
morality. If the universe is truly indetermined in the context specified here, then metaethical morality does not and cannot exist in an objective sense.
If I was a gambling man, I would put my money on the libertarian account of
metaphysics, owing my decision to the way it provides both metaphysical and metaethical space to maneuver in order to uncover the mystery of how man is to live. As Dr.
Fischer said in his presentation referenced at the beginning of this paper, “you are more
than welcome to disagree with me.”
And now we have reached the end. I would like to quote Dr. Fischer by saying
that “Even if I somehow discovered there is but one path into the future, I would still care
deeply how I walked down that path. I would aspire to walk with grace and dignity. I
would want to have a sense of humor. Most of all, I would want to do it my way.”18

18 John Martin Fischer. The Metaphysics of Free Will. Page 216. Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 1994. Print
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